Relations of King Matthias Corvinus and the papacy have been studied by many historians since the nineteenth century. Uncovering and publishing sources that would elucidate this part of papal and central-European history was of prime interest. This paper tries to bring some new light to these relations thanks to a newly discovered instructions of the king to his envoy, Miklós Nyújtódi Székely, bishop of Knin, who travelled to Rome sometime in the beginning of 1472. On the basis of these instructions we can reconstruct the king's intentions and plans in the context of the political situation of central Europe in the early 1470s. At that time, relations to Bohemia and Poland set the framework of the policies, which were influenced from the papal side by the present papal nuncios, especially Lorenzo Roverella.
In his classical study, Vilmos Fraknói wrote about a number of Hungarian diplomats in the service of Matthias Corvinus.
1 In general, the king's diplomatic body was much larger, as it comprised not only Hungarians, but also inhabitants of his other countries and lands as well as Italians, who were involved in the diplomatic service in Italy and elsewhere. Thus, Fraknói's study, even though it is still used and will continue to be used as the basic source of information on a number of diplomats, can always be improved and complemented. This little paper, however, does not intend to provide another new or hitherto unknown diplomat. Quite on the contrary, the subject of this study is the activity of Miklós (Nicholas) Nyújtódi Székely, bishop of Knin and holder of other important ecclesiastical benefices.
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King Matthias Corvinus tried to increase royal power in late medieval Hungary, to which purpose he used strategies that enabled him to improve his standing in internal politics and on the international level. For both, he used homines novi, new men, who gave him their talents and efforts. In order to secure their support, Matthias had at his disposal, like his predecessor King Sigismund, high benefices of the Hungarian church. Canons and bishops were newly nominated by King Matthias and often served in his court or land offices, as well as in royal diplomacy. 3 Miklós Nyújtódi was one of such men. He came from the Transylvanian nobility and, like many other and later diplomats, pursued university studies. First he studied in Vienna (1448 Vienna ( -1456 and later on in Padua (1465), which made him an ideal person for diplomatic service. Italian experience was always highly valued by kings and princes beyond the Alps. At least in the Central European context, well-educated bishops and high prelates often played a decisive role in diplomatic service. Unlike in Italy, where career diplomats and ambassadors mainly belonged to the rank of chancellors and secretaries of the prince, while prelates and aristocrats fell into the category of occasional diplomats, 4 Nyújtódi was one of the many ambassadors of the Hungarian king to the Roman papal court, communication with which was very frequent. 6 In the second half of the fifteenth century, Rome was becoming a centre of international diplomacy, creating a multicultural and multinational setting for diplomatic activities. Recently, the study of diplomacy in Rome has been enriched with two crucial publications. First, it is the invaluable edition of an early sixteenth century treatise on ambassadors in Rome by Paride Grassi, which was for a long time studied only in manuscript. 7 The second book is a study on the resident ambassadors in Renaissance Rome by English historian Catherine Fletcher.
8 These volumes cannot help in finding new information on the activities of Miklós Nyújtódi, but they provide an important background for any such study. Miklós Nyújtódi was not a resident ambassador: he visited Rome several times, but only for brief periods of time, unlike some others, most significantly John Vitéz the Younger in the 1480s. According to the available sources, Miklós Nyújtódi was present in Rome three times; first in 1467, when he was confirmed as the bishop of Knin.
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Not much is known, however, of his other activities in Rome. The second time he went to Rome was during the first year of the pontificate of Sixtus IV; and again his activities have not been known to scholarship. 
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For the fifteenth century, it is often difficult to find out details about the actual activities, tasks, and assignments of individual ambassadors to Rome. Thus, it is always with a great deal of luck that new sources are discovered, which may illustrate the stays and activities of ambassadors in Rome. In case of Miklós Nyújtódi, there are a few sources that have hitherto not been used and that elucidate his second stay in Rome early in 1472. Biblioteca Angelica in Rome, at St Augustine's church, holds a manuscript containing a large number of texts, letters, charters, reports, and relations copied by a single scribe in 1510, as the first page of the manuscript announces.
12 The manuscript contains documents from the second half of the fifteenth and the early sixteenth century, all of which were carefully catalogued in 1893. 13 The catalogue, however, could not get behind the text and identify all the persons appearing in individual letters -218 numbers are listed for the manuscript -and thus it happened that the text given in the catalogue as "Informatio D. Tinimen. (!) ex parte Maiestatis Regie" remained unnoticed by the historians.
14 This text, however, is crucial for the tasks of Miklós Nyújtódi in Rome in 1472 and for understanding the needs and the policy of Matthias Corvinus during the same period in relation to the papal diplomacy in Central Europe. Before I analyse the text itself, it would be helpful to have a look at another document that is preserved, in this case, in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. It is a report by Marco Barbo, cardinal and legate to Germany and Central Europe in 1472 -1474. 15 Cardinal Marco Barbo was a close relative of the Venetian Pope Paul II, Pietro Barbo, and was appointed legate by his successor, Pope Sixtus IV, on 22 December 1471 together with four other cardinals. He left Rome two months later, on 22 February 1472, and -as will be argued later on -Miklós Nyújtódi may have met the cardinal in Rome already during this period and even joined his retinue during a journey to Central Europe. Marco Barbo is known to have reported to the consistory after his return about the results and events of 11 Fraknói, "Mátyás király magyar diplomatái", 33 (1899) On September 9, 1472 the two envoys -Mansueti and Nyújtódi -were sent by the legate to Nowy Sącz close to the Polish-Hungarian border, where they were to await his response after the talks he planned to have personally with the Polish king. A week later, Barbo instructed Mansueti about everything he negotiated with King Casimir; however, he did not meet Nyújtódi as the latter did not wait and left for Hungary before the legate's arrival. Nevertheless, the cardinal ordered another prelate in his retinue, Leonello Chieregato, bishop of Rab in Dalmatia (perhaps because he was also a Dalmatian bishop like Miklós), to write detailed instructions to Miklós Nyújtódi; the legate added an explanation of the new conditions of the truce (especially concerning Victorin) in his own hand. Mansueti then carried the letter to the Hungarian court, where he was to act together with the bishop of Knin. Clearly, Miklós Nyújtódi was considered an important envoy and negotiator at the court of Matthias. He may have gained the trust of Cardinal Marco Barbo during their previous meetings and possibly talks in Rome, or on the way if they travelled together. As mentioned earlier, Miklós was sent to Rome by the king early in 1472. The reason is not clearly known, but -coming back to the "Informatio" -the instructions of King Matthias shed light on Miklós' tasks in Rome, possibly on his dealings with the new legate to Central Europe, and subsequently on Matthias' policy during the early 1470s.
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The text of the "Informatio domini Tininien. ex parte maiestatis regie, " as it is titled in the manuscript, contains instructions and argumentations that are divided into ten articles/paragraphs. They all have much in common, namely a discussion of the current Central European situation in relation to papal diplomacy in the region. In the beginning, the bishop of Knin is advised to say that the king was very much surprised and disturbed when he learned that the pope intended to send another legate. This is the basic statement and all the ten articles bring arguments in favour of keeping the situation as it was. The king understands the papal decision only as something based on the suggestions of his enemies and reminds the pope that he has brought himself into more danger for the apostolic see than any other king (article 1). If the present legate were recalled and a new one sent, he might do a lot of damage to the cause of faith and the matters of the king before he can understand the "lies of the Poles and the tricks of the heretics" (2). Under the present legate the king understood Lorenzo Roverella, bishop of Ferrara and a nuncio cum potestate legati de latere, who had been present in the region from the late 1450s. As a learned theologian he joined Cardinal Juan Carvajal on his second legation to Germany and Hungary in 1457. In the early 1460s, he was active as a nuncio in France and Burgundy, and upon his return to Rome in 1462 he closely cooperated with Pius II. His next mission to Central Europe took place only in 1467, when he was commissioned by Pope Paul II to act as a papal nuncio at the Nuremberg diet. In January 1468, his office was extended to include other lands of Central Europe, especially Hungary, and he gained the title of nuncio cum potestate legati de latere. His tasks included fighting the Hussite heresy and King George of Bohemia and cooperating with the kings of Poland and Hungary; furthermore, he was entitled to preach the crusade, publish indulgences, and collect money. Generally, it was the anti-Czech and anti-Hussite fight that was his crucial assignment. Without going into detail, it is clear that Lorenzo took over the initiative from the aging Rudolf of Rüdesheim. Together with Rudolf and another papal nuncio, Gabriele Rangoni, they represented papal policy in the region even in the sphere of highest political negotiations. They were present when Matthias was elected King of Bohemia in Olomouc (1469) and also when Matthias wanted to be re-elected by the Bohemian land diet in 1471, after the death of King George. When rejected, Matthias forced Lorenzo to confirm him as the king of Bohemia in Jihlava. In a well-known report to the pope, the bishop of Ferrara complained that he was compelled to do that right after the king learned about the outcome of the election diet in Kutná Hora, which elected King Wladislas II Jagiellonian, son of Casimir IV, King of Poland.
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Even though the relations between the king and the then "legate" were not always ideal, it is clear that the king had gotten used to him and that he considered Lorenzo Roverella a useful partner in his dealings with the current political situation. The king then continues in his "Informatio" on the same note, claiming that the Poles would say that the pope's decision only confirmed that they were right and that the current legate did everything only de suo capite (3). The Poles would, moreover, celebrate that the pope is on their side and that he understood the justice in this case (4). This, the king said, would be very dangerous for the situation of the Catholics in Bohemia, who would be weakened and their position jeopardized by the stronger Utraquists supported by the lies of the Poles and by access to the son of the king of Poland, who is "now in Prague" (5). Revoking the current legate would cause scandals everywhere -"not only among the Bohemians, but in all other regions" -because he was the legate who confirmed Matthias as the king of Bohemia with apostolic authority. It was always promised that the apostolic see would never give up this claim, but now it would be believed that the pope deceived the king (6). The king of Hungary feels it important to remind the pope of the confirmation, which was expected long ago and was still not coming. The confirmation of nuncio Lorenzo Roverella was mentioned above. This last argument concerning Lorenzo was quite strong. Cardinal Marco Barbo was granted the authority (facultas) to confirm the election of King Matthias as the king of Bohemia and thus the former confirmation of nuncio Lorenzo Roverella.
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The conditions on which this authority could be used, however, were specified in the instructions for the legate published just five days later: it could be used only in case when there was no longer any hope of reaching peace through negotiation. Even though Kings Matthias and Casimir did not reach any agreement before Marco Barbo left, there is no trace of using this faculty and confirming Matthias as the king of Bohemia. However, a contemporary copy of papal confirmation is kept in the archives of Třeboň: the pope confirmed the king almost four years later, on December 9, 1475, in a letter addressed to the adherents of King Matthias in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and the Lusatias. 26 To complete the picture it may be added that King Wladislas, the firstborn son of Casimir, king of Poland, was confirmed by the pope as the king of Bohemia only on May 18, 1487: it was by Pope Innocent VIII, on the occasion of an obedience embassy sent by the king.
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The seventh article then concludes, concerning the keeping of Lorenzo Roverella in his position, that calling off the nuncio would mean deriding the king and that everyone would understand it as a destructive act. Instead, the papal nuncio should be confirmed; not only because of the person himself, even though the king does love the bishop of Ferrara for his virtues, enthusiasm for the Catholic faith, and justice, but also because of the current state of affairs.
To prove the point with even stronger arguments, King Matthias wanted Miklós to stress the devastation that the Polish invasion had brought to Hungary, and that it was connected to the plot against the king. According to the instructions, the bishop of Knin was ordered to say that the Poles, together with the heretics and the Tartars, carried out such despicable and vicious crimes that even pagans could not do. They plundered and damaged churches, stole and desecrated the holy relics, which they threw away in order to steal the golden and silver reliquaries. Moreover, they trampled upon the Eucharist, ravished and violated virgins, robbed and killed the poor. This is a stereotypical set of accusations referring to an invasion by an external foe. However, such rhetoric must also have been used to support Matthias's argumentation. Nyújtódi was instructed to add that all the Poles had been expelled, killed, or taken into captivity and their equipment and wagons captured. This was intended to show the pope that the king had many enemies; therefore, the pope was to understand that it was a dangerous situation for the king, who was surely willing to make an agreement in worldly matters, but such enemies should always be rewarded adequately (8). This incursion of Prince Casimir, the second son of the Polish king, and the conspiracy led by John Vitéz and Janus Pannonius are well known in Hungarian scholarship. Clearly, the motives behind them would have been different for different parties -in case of John Vitéz and Janus Pannonius, the historians even mention an attempt to stop the war against Bohemia.
28 The problematic nature of the Bohemian war, which brought destruction even to Hungary, has been mentioned also on the Polish side, namely in the work of Jan Długosz, who also confirmed that there were one thousand Tartars in the invading army.
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Further instructions for the bishop of Knin concern the current papal policy. The king even slightly criticizes the pope for writing so many letters to the heretical Bohemians, and then again tries to strengthen his own position in the eyes of the papacy, claiming that he has put himself into danger and suffered destruction in his own kingdom only for his reverence to the apostolic see. He has never wanted to fight against Christians, unless he was forced to do so. When the son of the Polish king went to Bohemia, the Polish king did not assent to negotiations, which the king of Hungary was prepared to lead. On the contrary, Casimir trusted the traitors, who reported of Matthias' death and promised to give him also the kingdom of Hungary. At this point, it was clear to the king of Hungary that he had to strike against the traitors, who -by now -had all been expelled from the country (9). Here Matthias indirectly stressed his main task and the main task of the papacy, which was to fight against the Turks. Even though he did not actively fight at that point, it was fighting the Christians, which he was forced to do, that distracted him from the main goal. For the papacy, again, this was the proper rhetoric to prove his point. Concerning the papal attempts to secure peace in the region, the king mentions the activity of the papal nuncio Tilmann Schlecht, who came to Poland and Hungary in autumn 1471, just at the time of the Polish invasion. The nuncio should report himself to the pope on what he talked about in Poland, but the king could account for all his deeds, when interrogated (9). Tilmann Schlecht was a canon in Cologne, but -like many others -had experience from the region from the second legation of Cardinal Juan Carvajal to Germany and Hungary; he served as a notary in the retinue of the legate. planned to continue his peace talks in Hungary in December. All was, however, ruined by the new military activities and aspirations of Prince Casimir.
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The king summarized his conclusion in the tenth paragraph, asking the pope to act swiftly and confirm all the queries of the bishop of Knin if he wanted to achieve anything against the Turks and the heretics. Most importantly, he should not believe the Poles, "who are not afraid of God and do not respect any people" and who support the heretics. They are not afraid of losing their soul for robbery and have even occupied -again quite an important rhetorical element -the property and patrimony of St Peter and the Order of the Virgin Mary (i.e. the Teutonic knights), deriding excommunication. The king wishes that the pope would trust him at least in his deeds and confirm what was suggested in the instructions to the bishop of Knin. What is crucial, the king will not act without the consent of the legate and his nuncios. If the situation is going to develop against the king's will, however, he will be free of guilt: although he has always put his person and his kingdom in danger, if deserted by all who have been helping him so far, he will not be able to withstand the enemies (10). The text of the instructions for the bishop of Knin Miklós Nyújtódi, which has been partially retold here, not only fits perfectly the current political situation at the turn of 1471/1472, but also contributes to the understanding of the turbulent times after the death of the Bohemian king George of Poděbrady and the Polish involvement in Bohemia and Hungary. Miklós Nyújtódi was the carrier of information and the presenter of the king's argumentation, which was intended to win the pope's support for Matthias' policy. It can be seen that the king was not quite sure of this support although modern scholarship does not doubt it. The reason was, of course, the Bohemian affairs. The king was not confirmed as the king of Bohemia by the pope until 1475; the legatine confirmation was administered by the nuncio cum potestate legati de latere Lorenzo Roverella in 1471, but it had to be forced; when the relation with Roverella worked well (or at least it was presented as such by the king), Matthias was afraid that the nuncio would be exchanged for a new legate, who would not understand the region and the problems. This may have been the original reason for sending Miklós Nyújtódi to Rome early in 1472: namely, to explain the king's position and to secure the continuation of papal policy in the person of Roverella. The king could not stop the appointment of a new legate, but Nyújtódi's action was definitely not a failure. It is clear that Cardinal Marco Barbo was well informed about the situation and about the king's problems. The details of all the instructions of Marco Barbo cannot be included in this paper, but they show that he was prepared to divide the kingdom of Bohemia or confirm Matthias as its king. The talks between the Kings of Poland and Hungary belonged to the main points of his legation, which was planned to bring peace to the region in order to create the conditions for the more important fight or even crusade against the Turks. Miklós Nyújtódi, then, was a part of the negotiations as an envoy between the legate, whom he tried to stop in Rome, and the king, who (despite his originally low expectations) could not have much cause for complaint about Cardinal Marco Barbo. Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, ms. 1077, fol. 36v-38v
APPENDIX
Informatio domini Tininien. ex parte maiestatis regie.
In primis, dicat Tinen. sanctissimi domini nostri pape, quod maiestas regia percepto, quod sanctitas sua alium legatum mittere vellet, plurimum turbata fuit. Primo quia non potest intelligere, quod hoc fiat, nisi ad suggestionem inimicorum suorum et ideo gravissime fert, quod ipse, qui exposuit se et sua a tanta pericula, ad quanta nullus rex legitur pro sancta sede apostolica, debeat postponi illis, qui . Item dicat sanctissimo domino nostro, quod maiestas regia non parum miratur de tenore istarum literarum, quas sanctitas sua catholice Boemis scribit. Cum imprimo anno, quando maiestas regia nec dictam esset in regem cum efficatoribus, multum literis predecessor sue sanctitatis ipsos Bohemos hortatus fuit ad assistentiam et perseverantiam cum sua maiestate et post electionem laudati et conmendati sunt, atque affirmant ei obediendum et fortiter secum standum. Incitati inmo catholici sunt ita informati, quod credant sedem apostolicam maiestatem regiam nullo modo relicturam, a qua fide non sine eorum magna tribulatione et fidei detrimento, si litere ille presentarentur, multi possent ammoveri. Unde dicit maiestas regia, quod cum sincero animo et bona voluntate hactenus servierit apostolice sedis et propriam personam tantis periculis exposuerit nec aliquid egerit, propter quod ipsa sedes indignari debeat. Cogitur de hac re multum admirari et suspicari, quod accusatores ei non deficiant, quibus putat iustum esse, quod non credatur ipso non audito. Super hoc concludat ipse dominus Tinen., quod dominus rex recto animo semper incessit et incedere intendit, et si adiutus fuerit, sua tempora cupit contra infideles expendere et ita laborare, quod possit aut vitam mereri, possit gratiam apud deum in alia. Si autem papa vel quicunque alii deliberaverit potius audire emulos, qui sue felicitati invident et propter sua privata odia non curant impedire bonum totius christianitatis, etiam sua maiestas conmendabit se deo et sperat, quod iuvabit innocentiam suam et respiciet ad fidelia opera sua, etiam si homines noluerint illa advertere et nihilominus dicat dominus 
Sažetak
Ugarski kralj Matjaš Korvin održavao je bliske kontakte s papinstvom te je nastojao ispuniti nekoliko zadaća koje je papa od njega zatražio. Te su zadaće krajem šezdesetih i početkom sedamdesetih godina 15. stoljeća bile uglavnom povezane s Češkom i suzbijanjem "heretik, " a samim time i s Poljskom uslijed borbe za češku krunu. Spomenute kontakte valjalo je održavati posredstvom diplomata s obiju strana, odnosno papinskih legata i nuncija. Miklós Nyújtódi Székely bio je jedan od diplomata u službi kralja Matjaša. Potjecao je iz transilvanijskog plemstva, a studirao je u Beču i Italiji. Tijekom bečkih studija postao je kanonik u Székesfehérváru, a kasnije je stekao i druge crkvene nadarbine, ukjučujući kninsku biskupiju 1467. godine. Sveučilišno obrazovanje i crkvene nadarbine definirale su živote mnogih osoba koje je ugarski kralj želio koristiti kao diplomate. Biskupovo djelovanje dobro je poznato, a osobito ga je detaljno prikazao Vilmos Fraknói u studijama o diplomatima u službi kralja Matjaša. No iako mu je bilo poznato da je Miklós predvodio izaslanstvo u Rim početkom 1472., nije se znalo o kojim se specifičnim zadaćama radilo. Međutim, jedan rukopis u rimskoj Biblioteca Angelica sadrži tekst pod naslovom Informatio domini Tininien. ex parte maiestatis regie, skup detaljnih uputa za pregovore pri papinskoj kuriji u Rimu. Ovaj tekst otkriva kraljeve namjere i poteškoće, budući da on nije bio zadovoljan nedostatkom papine podrške, a uz to je bio uznemiren stanjem u srednjoj Europi te postupcima svojih protivnika u Češkoj i osobito u Poljskoj. Stoga je istaknuo razaranja koja su nanijele poljske vojne operacije 1471. Također je istaknuo svoju spremnost da se bori na strani papinstva, no zauzvrat je tražio jasan izraz podrške protiv svojih neprijatelja u regiji. Tekst jasno pokazuje kako je kralj želio da papa zadrži tadašnjeg nuncija Lorenza Roverellu na položaju. Nakon razgovora u Rimu Nyújtódi je ostao u kontaktu s novim legatom u regiji Marcom Barbom, koji je došao kako bi vodio mirovne pregovore između kršćanskih vladara. Ove upute i
